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Abstract 
 
This paper reports the results of behavioral economic experiments conducted in Peru to examine the relationship 
amongst risk preferences, loan take-up, and insurance  purchase decisions. This area-based yield insurance can 
help reduce people's vulnerability to large scale covariate  shocks,  and  can  also  lower  the  loan  default  
probability  under  extreme  negative covariate shocks. In a context of collateralized formal credit markets, we 
provide suggestive evidence that insurance may help reduce the fear of losing collateral that  prevents potential 
borrowers from taking loans. Framing these experiments to recreate a real life situation, we started with a 
Baseline Game where subjects had to choose between a fallback production project  and  an  uninsured  loan.  We 
then introduced a third project choice, loan with yield insurance (Insurance Game), which allows us to measure the 
effect of introducing insurance on the demand for loans. Overall, more than 50 percent of the subjects are willing to 
buy insurance in this insurance game. Further, controlling for the number of peers in the agricultural network, 
wealth, and   choices made in the baseline game, we find that the project choice decision is predicted by a judgment 
bias known as hot-hand effect, and risk aversion. In the latter case, the shape  of  the  relationship  is  quadratic,  
meaning  that  highly  risk  averse  subjects  will  prefer switching to the risky, uninsured loan project, while  those 
showing a low and moderate risk aversion will stick to the safer (fallback or insured loan) projects. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Risk is widespread  in less developed economies, where low-income people living in rural  areas  are 
exposed to several potentially catastrophic hazards,  such as severe weather  events, which are often 
more detrimental  than  the  series of idiosyncratic  shocks that periodically  affect  them.   In order 
to  manage  and  deal  with  risk,  those  people  have  traditionally used  a series of ex-ante  and  ex- 
post strategies,1 with less than desired results.  Despite the substantial efforts  made to reduce their 
vulnerability to negative economic shocks, recent evidence suggests that the consumption variability 
at  the individual  level still remains  high in the developing  world (Dercon,  2005; Morduch,  1995). 
Depending  on the  nature  and  magnitude of those  shocks, this  lack of appropriate equipment may 
lead people to chronic poverty,  thus affecting  their possibilities to engage in an economically viable 
growth  path.2 
In addition  to individual  specific efforts  displayed  to handle  risk, innovative  financial products, 
such as uncollateralized microloans and index-based insurance,  have been designed and implemented  
from the supply side.  On the one hand,  in the wake of the so-called microfinance revolution,  poor 
people,  typically  unable  to  offer  collateral,   have  become  eligible  to  get  credit  access  and  take 
advantage  of business opportunities.  On the other  hand,  moral-hazard proof insurance  written  on 
average aggregate  indices has emerged with the promise of helping households keep valuable  assets 
which could otherwise  be lost as a result  of extreme negative  shocks. 
Besides smoothing  consumption over time,  index-based  insurance  may also have an appealing 
property in a scenario  where a significant proportion  of potential borrowers  are discouraged  from 
applying  for loans  because  of their  fear  of losing collateral  in  case of default:   by  reducing  the 
likelihood of a loan default,  it may stimulate  a proportion  of those  fearful producers  to enter  the 
credit  market.   Given that such  voluntary  withdrawing  from  the  credit  market,  termed  as risk 
rationing  (Boucher  et  al.,  2008),  has  been  shown to  be an  empirically  relevant  phenomenon  in 
Peru,  where we conduct  our research,3   it  is expected  that the  introduction of such an insurance 
scheme would have a positive effect on the expansion  of the credit market. 
The extent to which insurance can help expand credit markets in less developed countries is an 
empirical question that has not  suficiently been investigated. With  only a few index-based  insurance 
programs  operating  in less developed  countries, the  literature on the  linkage between  credit and 
index insurance  (or any type of insurance  for that matter) is at best scant.  To our knowledge, with  
the  probable  exceptions  of  a  handful  of works,4   no other  study  has  addressed,  directly  or 
1 Risk  management,  ex-ante  strategies,  may  include  income  diversification,  savings,  insurance,  participation  in 
rotating  saving  and  credit  associations  (ROSCAs);   while  risk  coping,  ex-post  strategies,  may  include  the use  of 
informal loans, liquidation of assets, and reallocation of labor, among others. 
2 The literature on poverty has documented this case, in which when households  fall below certain threshold—the 
Micawber  Frontier—their prospects to escape from poverty are negligible (Carter and Barrett, 2006). 
3 In Peru,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua, risk rationed  borrowers  account  for between  12 and  19 percent  of  the total 
sample of borrowers (Boucher  et al., 2008). 
4 Cole et al.  (2008) examined  the obstacles to a wider insurance  take up in India; Giné and Yang (2009) analyzed 
whether  rainfall  insurance  can  help  increase  demand  for loans  in a randomized  control  trial in Malawi;  Giné  et al. 
(2009)  experimentally  tested  the demand  for different  microfinance  contracts  in  urban  Peru;  and  Lybbert  (2006) 
designed experiments in Morocco to elicit willingness to pay for seeds that increase yields, reduce yields variance  or 
yields skewness. 
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indirectly,  the  three  issues that concern  this  paper:  the  interaction between  risk preferences  and 
demand for credit and insurance. 
This  paper  uses a unique  experimental data  set gathered  in Peru,  where we set up an experi- 
mental economics laboratory and run experiments  that examine the nature and main predictors of 
the  demand  for loans and  index-based  insurance;  we label these behavioral  experiments “farming 
experiments." We are particularly interested in examining  the effect of risk preferences (estimated 
in a companion  paper,  Galarza [2009]) on the  decision to purchase  an innovative  type of crop in- 
surance.5  Our  farming  experiments simulated  farming  decisions where our experimental subjects 
chose among  alternative cotton  production  projects:  fallback (low return, or safe), produce  with 
an uninsured  loan (high  return, or risky),  or produce  with  an insured  loan (less risky ).  Using a 
payoffs scheme for each project in order to incentivize subjects  to reveal their true preferences, this 
paper develops an approach that is also used as a tool to build people’s comprehension  of this new 
insurance  product. 
A novel feature  of this  experiment  is that projects’  profits  depend  on the realizations  of two 
random shocks: a covariate, correlated  shock, represented by the valley-wide average yield, and an 
idiosyncratic shock.  Projects’ profits, constructed using survey data  from the Pisco valley, are such 
that the uninsured loan does not yield suficient profits to fully repay  the loan under  a “very low" 
realization  of the valley-wide average yield, regardless of the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. In 
contrast, the insured loan’s profits guarantee  full repayment of loans under  every realization  of the 
two random shocks. In order to reproduce the dynamic effects that defaulting  on a collateralized  
loan involves, we imposed two  consequences  of not  repaying  a loan in the  experiment:   no future 
access to loans, and a depreciation of land. 
Our  sample  includes  378 experimental  subjects  from  rural  Peru.  The  experiments   started 
with  a baseline  experiment,  where  farmers  had  to  choose between  the  fallback  project  and  the 
uninsured  loan project,  in a series of repeated  rounds  that simulated  single farming  seasons. We 
then introduced the insured loan to the set of choices available (insurance experiment ). This design 
allows us testing  whether  the introduction of insurance  affects  farmers’ choice between the safe and 
the risky project. 
Our findings are as follows. First,  the experimentally-measured demand  for valley-wide average 
yield insurance  is fairly high:  57 percent of farmers demanded  the insured  loan project  by the last 
two high-stake rounds,  a proportion  that remains  rather steady  during  all the  high stakes rounds. 
Second,  our  experimental  results  suggest  that index  yield insurance,  by  reducing  the likelihood 
of loan  defaults,  may  crowd-in  credit  markets  by a sizeable proportion.  We find  that about  60 
percent of the subjects  who chose the  fallback,  safe project  (i.e., 24 percent of the  total  subjects) 
in the baseline experiment switched  to the insured  loan project  in the insurance  experiment. This 
result indicates  that insurance  would allow almost 14 percent of the  total number  of subjects  not 
5 This research pro ject was carried out in partnership with an insurance  company in Peru and a vendor of insurance  
contracts bundled with loans that operates in our research  site, the Pisco valley.  At all times during the course of the 
experimental  sessions, we emphasized  the fact  that our  participation  as  researchers  was simply  intended  to inform 
farmers  about  the main  features  of this  new financial  product and to examine their willingness to buy it.  We also 
stressed the fact that participating in these sessions should not make them feel obliged to buy insurance. 
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to withdraw  from the credit  market.6    While such estimated magnitude may be used with caution,  
it  is  suggestive  that insurance  could  encourage  the  undertaking of riskier  but  potentially more 
profitable production  projects  thanks to new funds coming from a loan.  Third,  controlling wealth 
and choices made in the baseline experiment, we find evidence of ‘hot-hand’ effects (stemming from an 
underestimation in the  autocorrelation of the sequence of ‘very  bad’  years)  in project  choice, 
while static  risk preferences  estimated  under  Expected  Utility  Theory  (EUT)  appear  to  have  a 
quadratic (concave)  relationship with project  choice, meaning  that highly risk averse subjects  will 
prefer switching to the risky project (uninsured loan), while those showing a low and moderate risk 
aversion will stick to the safer (fallback or insured loan) projects.  This result  offers novel evidence 
about  the relationship between risk aversion and preferences for innovative  financial instruments. 
The remainder  of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our experimental design 
in the context  of related  works.  Section 3 describes the  experimental procedures  followed and the 
data  used;  and  also presents  a descriptive  analysis  of the results.    Section  4 analyzes  the  main 
econometric  results  and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Related Studies and Our Experimental  Design 
 
In this section, we review the literature relevant to our research  (section  2.1) and then  discuss the 
distinctive features of our experimental design in that context (section 2.2). Using the terminology 
coined by Harrison  and List (2004), our farming experiments  are framed  field experiments, as they 
concern valuations over a real commodity (cotton) and involve tasks similar to those performed  by 
the experimental subjects acting  in their  usual production environment. 
 
2.1 Related Studies 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed a rapid growth in the number of experimental studies in devel- 
opment economics.  Although  these works have analyzed  a wide gamut of topics, there still remains 
much to be done in terms  of applying  the laboratory  experimental tools in the analysis of develop- 
ment issues. In a survey of the literature about experiments  conducted in less developed countries, 
Cardenas  and Carpenter (2005) report that three  of the main topics studied  are the measurement 
of trust, cooperation,  and risk preferences; none of these studies investigates the role of elicited risk 
preferences in explaining the demand for financial contracts. 
A more recent set of behavioral  field experiments  that concern the topics analyzed in this paper 
involve testing  the demand  for microfinance contracts (Giné et al., 2009) and the willingness to pay 
for seeds that stabilize  yield distributions (Lybbert, 2006), using in both  cases a payoffs scheme to 
incentivize subjects’ truthful preference elicitation. Two other  works that used randomized  control 
trials to examine the demand for weather-based insurance  in India  and Malawi, respectively (Cole 
et al., 2008; Giné and Yang, 2010), will also be discussed below. 
6 After  this  round  in  default,  farmers  are  left  with  no  choice  but to do  the fallback  pro ject.   The  quantitative 
importance of this finding increases to about 20 percent when we use the modal  choice during the high-stake rounds. 
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Lybbert (2006) investigates  farmers’ preferences about three desirable properties  of cotton  seeds 
in India:  an increase  in average  yields, a reduction  in yields’  variance,  and  a reduction  in yields’ 
skewness. Using the Becker-DeGroot-Marchak method  (Becker et al., 1964) to elicit the maximum 
willingness to pay for those traits, where farmers were given the payoff distributions related  to each 
type  of seed before making  their  bid,7   Lybbert  shows that farmers  value seeds that increase  the 
expected  returns, but  no evidence about their  valuation of the other  two traits of seeds was found. 
As Lybbert  acknowledges, the lack of valuation of yield’s risk reduction (i.e., less variance)  may be 
explained  by the inability  of the experimental design to control  for the relevant factors  that affect 
farmer’s valuation of crop yield distributions. Lybbert’s results further  show no statistically strong 
relationship between any individual  characteristic (such  as wealth)  and expected  returns, a result 
that the author claims could be due to the existence of credit  constraints. 
Giné  and  Yang’s  (2010)  randomized  control  trial in Malawi  examine  whether  insurance  can 
induce  farmers  to  take  loans to  adopt  a new, high-yielding  seed variety.   The  control group  was 
offered a loan to purchase  a high-yielding seed; while the treatment group was offered an identical 
loan contract  but was  required  to buy actuarially fair rainfall-indexed insurance  if  they  took the 
loan.  This insurance can allow to partially or fully repay the loan, depending on how low the rainfall 
is. Thus, while assuming a risk averse behavior, one could expect insured farmers to be more willing 
to take out  a loan in order to undertake  a potentially more profitable investment (i.e., buying the 
high-yielding seed), Giné and Yang find exactly the  opposite  result:  loan take-up  rates  are much 
lower for the  treatment group  (17.6 percent  versus  33.0  percent).   The  authors suggest  that the 
low insured  loan take-up  could be due to the prior existence of limited  liability; that is, the actual 
consequences of defaulting  on a loan might not have been so severe in the first place, and thus the 
actual  value of buying insurance  would be limited.  In the same line, Cole et al.’s (2008) randomized  
control trials in India  aim to identify  the barriers  to a wider adoption of rainfall insurance.   They 
find that subjects’ purchase  rates  are very price elastic,  and  that cash constraints seem to play a 
role in  insurance  adoption.  More interestingly, they  find  that third party endorsement  (such  as 
that of a local authority) of insurance  can affect  its take-up,  thus suggesting  a potentially strong 
correlation  between choices across subjects  from the same village. 
Our behavioral experiment shares some features in common with the previously discussed works, 
but it arguably  offers a more complete depiction  of how rural producers make production decisions. 
In  particular,  our  experiment  focuses  on  examining  the  interrelationship  among  three  themes: 
agricultural yields, loan, and insurance. In our  experiment, loans yield higher expected yields (i.e., a 
more profitable production) and insurance  eliminates  the possibility of defaulting  on a loan, thus 
securing the  farm production and  ensuring farmers  to keep access to loans in the  future.   Written 
on valley-wide yields, this insurance  protects producers from catastrophic events that dramatically 
reduce average yields at the valley level. Subjects’ farming profits depend on two random  variables: 
7 Once farmers  bid a price,  a random  seed price was drawn  from a uniform  distribution  with  mean  of  50 Rupees 
(Rs.).   Thus,  if farmers  bid  at least  the amount  of the randomly  drawn  price,  they  could  get  the seed and  “plant 
it", and get the corresponding  payoff.  After this, farmers  draw  a chip from a bag to determine the season’s harvest 
payoff.  Thus,  for a farmer  who planted the seed, his net earnings would be the harvest payoff,  minus the price paid 
for the seed, plus 50 Rs.  (off-farm  earnings),  while for  one who did not  plant the seed, it would be only the 50 
Rs. corresponding  to the off-farm  earnings. 
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a covariate  shock—represented by the  valley-wide average  yield—that affects  equally all subjects 
in the same valley, and an idiosyncratic shock, uncorrelated with the covariate  shock. 
Moreover,  while our  farming  experiments  are  close in spirit  to  the  randomized  control  trials 
conducted  by Giné and  Yang  (2010),  we used actual  payoffs  to incentivize  players to elicit their 
preferences for distinct production projects.  Moreover, our farming experiments  have greater  com- 
plexity than  the experiments of Lybbert (2006) in that our farmers’ payoffs for each project choice 
depend on two sources of  randomness, while in  Lybbert’s  experiments there  is only  a  random 
“yield risk" that subjects should consider before deciding their choice (a seed). Likewise, our farm- 
ing   experiments introduce additional  complexity  to  the  typical  individual  loan  experiments,  in 
which players have to choose whether  to request a loan with  a risky result,  or to invest  in a safe 
project (e.g., Giné et al., 2009), by providing subjects a more complete set of financial instruments 
to  finance  their  production.  Obviously,  the  greater  complexity  in  the  design of our experiments 
increases  the  challenges  for ensuring  experimental control.   In  the  next  section,  we discuss  our 
experimental design. 
 
2.2  Our Farming Experiments 
 
The  experiment  script  for our farming  experiments  was written  following standard experimental 
procedures as close as possible (Davis and Holt, 1993). Experiment trials were conducted  in Madison 
and Davis in the U.S. (with graduate students), and Lima (with social scientists and cotton farmers), 
and  the  valley of  Pisco and  its neighbor  Ica (with  cotton  farmers),  in Peru.   The  final  version of 
the script  was reviewed by a journalist who works closely with farmers,  in order to ensure that the 
language  used in the instructions would be understandable to a typical farmer. 
The farming experiments  were designed to examine the potential demand  for index-based  crop 
insurance and analyze the effects of buying insurance on the demand for loans. In these experiments,  
we simulated  farming decisions where subjects,  endowed with  a “hectare  of land",  had  to choose 
among alternative cotton production projects—fallback (safe project),  take an uninsured  loan (risky 
project), and take a loan bundled  with index yield insurance  (insured  loan, less risky project)8 —in 
a series of repeated  rounds. 
Each project yields a related  profit, which is known to subjects before they make their decisions. 
In the cases of the  uninsured  loan and  the  insured  loan projects,  profits depend additively  on the 
realization of two random variables:  a covariate shock (represented by the valley-wide average yield), 
and  an  idiosyncratic  shock.   The  probability distributions  of both  shocks  were estimated  using 
information from the  Pisco  valley.   In particular, detrended 1986-2006 time  series data  of valley 
yields (yt), expressed  in Kilograms  per hectare,  were fitted  to  a Weibull  density  function.   The 
parameters of the Weibull function were estimated using maximum  likelihood in Gauss:9 
 
 
yt ~  Weibull (6.00, 1806.08), (1) 
 
8 Throughout the paper  we use interchangeably the terms fallback, and safe  pro ject; the terms unisured  loan  and 
risky pro ject, and the terms insured loan  and loan bund led with yield insurance  pro ject. 
9 We used  the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno  (BFGS)  algorithm.  The  parameters’  standard  deviations  are 
1.03 and 70.17. 
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which has mean of 1,674 Kilograms  per hectare. 
Moreover,  four-year  (2002-2005) panel data  were used to estimate  the  distribution of the  idio- 
syncratic shocks ( it),
10  using the following fixed effects  model: 
 
yit  - µi = βi(yt - µ) + εit; (2) 
 
 
which  regresses  the farmer  i’s  yields  (yi) deviation  from  its  mean, µi, on  the deviation  of the 
sample ’s average yields (yt) from its mean (µ). 
We then  discretized  the  densities  of valley yields; yt
11  (Weibull), and  idiosyncratic shocks,   it 
(Normal  distribution, centered  on zero), in order  to simulate  the  effects  of distinct realizations  of 
those shocks on profits.  In particular, we divided the density of yt  into five sections—labeled  as very 
low, low, normal,  high,  very high —having the  following probabilities (in percent):   10, 20, 40, 20, 
and  10.  Analogously,  the  density of  it was divided  into three  sections—labeled  as bad, normal,
12 
and good —with the following probabilities:  25, 50, and 25. 
Once we performed  the  estimations above,  all yield figures were converted  to quintals  (QQ)13 
(1 quintal  = 46 Kilograms),  a denomination familiar to our subjects.  Thus, the valley average yield 
values, yt,  corresponding  to the  mid-point  of those  sections  are (in rounded  figures):  23, 30, 37, 
43, and  48 quintals per hectare,  respectively.  In the  case of the  idiosyncratic shocks, we consider 
the  deviations  from the  “normal" category,  expressed  as  ∆εit, in the  computation of the profits. 
In  particular, the  mid-point  of the  “bad"  luck category  lies –12.12 percent  (below) the  center  of 
the distribution of, while the mid-point of the “good"  luck category  lies 11.63 percent above the 
center  of the distribution. 
The  farmer  i’s  per  hectare  profits  in Soles from the  insured  and  uninsured  loan  projects  at 
each section of the valley yield and idiosyncratic  shock densities,  was computed using the following 
formula: 
 
Пit
project 
= (p . yt) *  (1 + ∆εit) -  (1 + r)Loan + p* I ndemnity - premium; (3) 
 
where the  price (p) of a quintal  of cotton  is set at  124.2 Soles, the  loan size (Loan) used is 2,464 
Soles (equivalent  to US$800 at  the  time  of conducting  the  experiment),  and  the  interest  rate  (r) 
was set at 30 percent (the  going rate  at that time).  Insurance  contract is written  on 85 percent of 
the average valley yields, equivalent to 31 quintals  per hectare  (=1,674/46 = 36.4 x 0.85)14  and the 
premium  was set  at  150  Soles per insured  hectare.15    Thus,  the Indemnity  (expressed  in quintals 
per hectare) in period  t is defined  as I (yt < 31)  *  (31- yt),  where I(.) is the  indicator  function. 
This indexed insurance  thus covers any shortfall  in valley average yields below the 31 quintals  per 
1 0 This is also a measure  of the uninsured,  or basis risk, uncovered  by insurance. 
1 1 Note  that y  represents  the valley  average  yield,  while  y  refers  to the sample  average  used  to  estimate  the 
idiosyncratic shocks. 
1 2 The “Normal" categories of those shocks lie roughly  at the center of their respective densities. 
1 3 A Quintal  is equivalent to 100 pounds, which is in turn roughly  equivalent to 46 Kilograms. 
1 4 This strike yield was set after game trials in Pisco, where most sub jects preferred the 85 percent strike yield over 
the 65 percent and 90 percent strike yields. 
1 5 This premium  includes a mark-up  or load of 40 percent over the actuarially fair price (107 Soles per hectare). 
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hectare,  as depicted  by the solid line in Figure 1, where we also plot the estimated Weibull density 
of the  average  valley yields.   The  indemnity  function  for the  100 percent  contract  (dotted line), 
with a strike yield of 36.4 quintals  per hectare,  is also pictured  for comparison. 
 
 
Figure  1: Indemnity  and Valley Yield Density  Functions for Pisco 
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Furthermore, in order  to  simplify  the  implementation of the  experiment, we considered  the 
case of the typical farmer  (i.e.,  βi = 1), which basically  implies a one-to-one  relationship between 
individual farmer’s yields (yit) and actual average valley yields (yt), using the expression indicated  in 
eqn.[2]. The figures of individual  yields used in the profit function shown in eqn.[3] then correspond 
to  the mid-point  value  of the  valley  yields  at  every  section  of its  density  (23,  30,  37,  43,  and 
48 quintals  per  hectare,  going from “very  low"  to “very  high"  yields):  yit  = yt.   The  resulting 
profit  figures  were  rounded  to  the  nearest  50. For  the  fallback  project,  profits  were  adjusted 
accordingly to get lower but more stable profits than in the uninsured loan case.16  We will discuss the 
characteristics of the resulting  profits for each project  in the next  section. 
As mentioned  earlier, our behavioral  experiments  consisted  of a sequence of two sets of experi- 
ments.  We started with a baseline experiment,  where farmers  had to opt for either  the fallback or 
the  uninsured loan project.  And then,  we continued  with  an insurance  experiment,  where a third  
alternative project (insured  loan)  was included  in the  set of choices.  This  sequential  structure  of 
the experiments  allows us to examine any changes in farmers’ choices between the first two projects 
after  the introduction of insurance. 
An important characteristic of the uninsured  loan project is that when the valley average yield 
 
1 6 We further assumed  a symmetric distribution for the idiosyncratic shock around the mean of zero. 
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is very low, the  farming  income is not  suficient  to repay the  loan, regardless  of the  idiosyncratic 
shock.  Defaulting  on a loan involves two negative consequences in the experiment:  no future access 
to credit  (i.e., subjects must do the fallback project)  and a 50 percent decrease in the value of the 
“endowed"  land.  The value of a hectare  of land was set at  2,400 Soles; the reduction  of this  value 
to 1,200 Soles is meant to simulate  the penalty that would occur after defaulting  on a collateralized  
loan.  On the other hand,  buying the (85 percent) insurance contract guarantees the full repayment 
of loans at every realization of the valley average yield and  the  idiosyncratic  shock, thus allowing 
farmers  to  keep the option  of choosing the  uninsured  loan project  in the  future  and  to  preserve 
their  land value. 
In the next section, we describe in detail the procedures  followed in the implementation of these 
farming experiments. 
 
 
3 Experimental  Procedures and Data 
 
Our  experimental design faced two major challenges:  to explain clearly the notion  of probabilities 
associated  with  the  different  sections  of the  probability distributions for the  covariate  and  idio- 
syncratic  shocks, and  to ensure  a minimum  level of comprehension  of the  insured  and  uninsured  
loan projects,  so that choices would be “informed." We responded  to the  first challenge by using 
transparent randomizing devices to simulate  the realizations  of the covariate  shocks (colored chips) 
and idiosyncratic shocks (colored ping-pong  balls),  which were referred  to as “individual luck,"  in 
order to convey the  idea that their individual  characteristics are uncorrelated among peers within 
a given valley.  These shocks were drawn from sacks containing  10 chips (1 black, 2 red, 4 white,  2 
blue, and  1 green)—the  “valley sack"—and  4  balls  (1 purple,  2 white,  and  1 yellow)—the   “luck 
sack"—which  reproduce  the probabilities structure mentioned  earlier,  going from the worst to the 
best outcome.  The design of the experiment worksheets reinforced the information  about the prob- 
abilities  under  each scenario of the covariate  shock and idiosyncratic  shock, by (i) spacing columns 
and rows, respectively,  in a roughly proportional manner;  and (ii) by including  pictures  in color of 
the actual colored chips and balls associated  with each scenario.  Table 1 shows a sample worksheet 
used for the insured loan project,  labeled as project C, in the actual  experiments.  A similar design, 
also printed in color, was used for the other projects’ worksheets. We will discuss the profits’ figures 
later. 
Secondly,  in order  to  enhance  subjects’  comprehension  of the  procedures,  field  assistants ex- 
plained  them  how the  combination of a covariate  shock and  an idiosyncratic shock drawn  deter- 
mined  the  profits  of the project  chosen in every decision round,  where each round  represented  a 
single farming  season.   The  monitor,  in charge  of giving the  instructions to all participants as a 
group, illustrated the rules and procedures with interactive  examples.  We also allowed participants 
to ask questions  during  the course of the presentation of the instructions.17  We were aware of the 
risks of doing this, but  we actually  did not receive questions  that may have induced players to play 
1 7 Key moments at which we specifically asked if they had any questions were: at the end of the pro ject description, 
and before the low- and high-stake rounds. 
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Table  1: Sample Game Worksheet  used for Project  C 
 
 
 
 
 
in a certain  way.18 
The experiment instructions were read aloud in Spanish  by the same monitor  in every session. 
The monitor  used a projector  to present the  information  about the  types of shocks, the projects’ 
characteristics and the sequence of the actions  subjects should follow in each decision round.  The 
contents of those  slides are provided  in Appendix  A.19  At the  beginning  of every session, all par- 
ticipants received a binder containing the worksheets with the information of the projects’ profits 
related to each type of covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, as well as a pencil to record their choices, the 
type of shocks realized, and the resulting  profits  in each simulated  farming  season.   Helping 
subjects  to see the  connection  between  their  choices, types of shocks drawn, and resulting profits, 
was also intended to enhance trust in our calculations of their experiment winnings. 
The farming experiment lasted three hours on average.  Total  experiment winnings in cash from 
participating in this  particular experiment  ranged  from 11 to 26 Soles, with  average  winnings of 
17 Soles (equivalent to $6).   Experiment winnings and attendance fees were paid at the end of 
the entire  session—which  also included  the  conduct  of the  risk experiment  (results  are  reported  
in Galarza  [2009]),  and  pre-experiment and  post-experiment surveys—that lasted  on average  five 
hours.20 
Recall that in all of our 24 sessions, participants were assigned to numbered  seats  at  random 
upon  arrival,  and  we divided  the  participants  into  at  most  four “valleys"  with  a minimum  of 3 
members in subjects’ each one. Splitting  subjects this way allowed us to get more variability in the 
realizations  of the covariate  shocks, to have a closer monitoring, and to accelerate  the  tasks.  Two 
persons  from our field  team  were in charge  of each valley.   A senior assistant,  well versed in the 
1 8 Most  of the questions  asked  concerned  the reasons  for the differences  in payoffs  from particular  pro jects  
under certain realizations of shocks; whether yield insurance  covered losses due to hazards  at the irrigation sector 
level; the source  of the (agricultural  production,  cost,  and  valley  yield)  figures  used  for  our analysis; whether the 
indemnity payments could be suficient to repay the loan; or the timing of the insurance  payouts; and the like. 
1 9 Out of the 24 sessions held,  only  in three  of them  we used  posters  containing  the same  information  as in the 
slides for a short time.  The monitor used sixteen slides to explain  the farming  and risk games. 
2 0 After  finishing  the farming  experiments  and  having  a  short  break,  a  risk  experiment—which  lasted about 30 
minutes on average—was ran.  The rest of the time—one hour and a half—was spent conducting the entry and exit 
surveys. 
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L Bad [0.25 ] 
u Normal [0.50 ] 
c Good [0.25 ] 
k Mean  
experiment rules and  procedures,  recorded  the players’ choices and  profits, and  did the  entry  and 
exit surveys,  while a helper assisted  with the drawing  of the covariate  and idiosyncratic shocks. 
Let  us consider  now the  structure of profits  associated  with  each type  of covariate  and  idio- 
syncratic  shock that was shown to  our  subjects.   Table  2 reports  the profits  calculated  without 
considering the probability of losing land.  As seen in the table, the uninsured  loan project (labeled 
as project  A) has higher, but more volatile,  expected profits than  the other  two projects;  with the 
fallback project (project B) being the least profitable project in expectation and the one with the 
lowest standard deviation (the safest). More specifically, the mean profits of the projects are:  1,355 
(project  A), 735 (project  B), and  1,283 (project  C), while their  standard deviations—reported in 
Table  3, columns 2 to 4—are 859, 331, and 767, respectively. 
 
 
Table  2: Farming  Game Profits 
(Expressed  in Soles per hectare) 
 
Valley-Wide  Average Yield 
 
Very Low Low Normal High Very High Mean 
(23 QQ) (30 QQ) (37 QQ) (43 QQ) (48 QQ)  
[0.10 ] [0.20 ] [0.40 ] [0.20 ] [0.10 ]  
Project A: Produce  cotton  with loan (uninsured loan) 
 
0 1 250 800 1,350 2,000 840 
0 1 600 1,400 2,100 2,700 1,370 
0 1 900 1,900 2,800 3,400 1,840 
0 588 1,375 2,088 2,700 1,355 
Project B: Produce  cotton  without a loan (fallback) 
L Bad [0.25 ] 300 400 600 900 1,350 665 
u Normal [0.50 ] 350 450 650 1,000 1,500 735 
c Good [0.25 ] 400 500 700 1,100 1,650 805 
k Mean  350 450 650 1,000 1,500 735 
Project C: Produce  cotton  with a loan & insurance  (insured  loan) 
L Bad [0.25 ] 150 150 650 1,200 1,850 730 
u Normal [0.50 ] 500 500 1,250 1,950 2,550 1,295 
c Good [0.25 ] 850 850 1,750 2,650 3,250 1,810 
k Mean  500 500 1,225 1,938 2,550 1,283 
Note: Subjects were shown this table, except for the averages  and probabilities. 
1  The values of unpaid  debts  were 700 (Bad  luck), 350 (normal  luck), and 50 (good luck). 
 
 
On the  other  hand,  considering  the  probability of losing land  (i.e., of losing 1,200 Soles when 
project A is chosen and a very low valley yield is realized) in the calculation  of projects’ profits, the 
mean profit of the insured  loan project becomes now the largest.  To make the figures comparable  
with  those  shown in the previous  table,  we only changed  the  profits for project  A under  the  very 
low average yield (reported a net loss of –1,200 instead  of 0), while in the  other  two projects,  no 
land losses are realized.  As a result,  while insurance  only decreases the standard deviation  of profits 
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from 859 to 76721  when no land losses are considered  (see columns 2 and 4 of Table  3), we can see 
a much greater  reduction  in volatility  when land losses are included in the profits calculation  (from 
1,099 to 767 in their  standard deviations22 ).  While we can easily notice that the expected  benefits 
from buying  insurance  would be even greater  in an intertemporal context,  in which the  land  not 
lost would yield potentially greater  profits, it is likely that our subjects  did not perceive this effect 
to its full extent.23 
Thus,  we will argue  that risk aversion considerations could better guide an ordering  in pref- 
erences.  One could then  state  that as risk aversion goes up,  subjects  would tend  to switch from 
the uninsured  loan (A) to the insured  loan project (C),  and then to the fallback project (B). This 
ordering,  which also  corresponds  to the  ranking  according  to the  standard deviation  of the  three 
projects’  profits  shown in  Table  3, will be used as the  base ordering  in the  econometric  analysis 
performed  in Section 4. We could use the ordering according to the total expected profits in future 
analysis. 
 
 
Table  3: Farming  Game Payoffs:  Mean and Standard Deviation 
(Expressed  in Soles per hectare) 
 
Excluding  Land Loss Including  Land Loss1 
 
 Unins.Loan 
(Project  A) 
Fallback 
(Project  B) 
Ins.  Loan 
(Project  C) 
 Unins.Loan 
(Project  A) 
Fallback 
(Project  B) 
Ins.  Loan 
(Project  C) 
Mean 1,355 735 1,283  1,235 735 1,283 
Stand.Dev. 859 331 767  1,099 331 767 
Ordering  considering: 
Mean 1st 3rd 2nd  2nd 3rd 1st 
Std.  Dev. 3rd 1st 2nd  3rd 1st 2nd 
1  Only the profits from project A under  the very low valley yield changed  (from 0 to -1,200). 
 
Turning  now to the procedures followed during the course of our farming experiments,  we started 
with  the  baseline  experiment,  and  continued  with  the insurance  experiment.   As is customary in 
experimental economics, each of those  experiments  started with  a set of six “low stakes"  rounds, 
intended  to get subjects familiar with the experiment rules and procedures, which were followed by a 
set of six “high stakes" rounds.  Subjects knew that all sets of rounds  would end with  the  sixth 
one.24 
In the  baseline  experiment,  subjects  chose between  the fallback  (project  B: cotton  without  a 
loan ) and the  uninsured  loan (project  A: cotton  with a loan ) projects.   The  sequence of events  in 
each round  of play, t, was as follows: 
2 1 To see more clearly the magnitude in the reduction of profits’ risk, this implies a reduction from 0.63 to 0.60 in 
the coeficient of variation of profits. 
2 2 Which  implies a substantial reduction in the coeficient of variation from 0.89 to 0.60 due to insurance. 
2 3 One  interesting  extension,  which  is  beyond  the scope  of this  paper,   would  be  to consider  that  farmers  use 
decision weights instead of ob jective probabilities in their expected calculations and to examine the ranking  of mean 
and standard deviation of those pro jects. 
2 4 After several experiment trials, we chose six rounds because it showed to have suficient variability in the covariate 
shocks.  In particular, we were interested in getting a very bad  valley-wide averge yield in each six-round campaign, 
so that farmers  would learn first hand the consequences of choosing the loan pro ject. 
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(i) All players selected their  favorite  projects; 
 
(ii)  (starting clockwise in each valley, v) one player drew a covariate  shock (represented by a colored 
chip) from the valley sack. Players  rotated this picking-the-chip role; 
 
(iii) then  each player  i drew his or her own idiosyncratic shock or “luck"  (colored ball)  from the 
luck sack; 
 
(iv) our assistants explained the profit corresponding to the triplet {project chosenivt,  covariate 
shockvt,  idiosyncratic shockivt} to each subject. 
 
Once  the  six  rounds  were  played,  one  of them  was  randomly  chosen  for  play  by  having  a 
participant  in each valley roll a six-sided die.  We used this  random  incentive  design in order  to 
preserve the proper incentives to carefully select every choice. This selection criterion  of the round 
for play was reminded  to all subjects  at the beginning  of each set of six rounds. 
Furthermore, in order  to include  the  effects  of losing collateral  into  the  decision-making,  the 
total  experiment  payoffs  included  the  value  of the  endowed  land  at  the  end  of the  every  set  of 
six rounds,  in  addition  to  the  experiment  profits  obtained  from the  project  chosen.   In order  to 
determine  the final land value, we used the following rule:  regardless of which round was chosen for 
play,  as long as in any  of them  the  following combination {uninsured loan;  black chip,  any 
colored ball} resulted,  farmers were paid half of the original land price.  Subjects’ winnings were 
as follows: for every 1,200 Soles of payoffs (profit plus land value),  participants would receive 1 Sol 
in cash.  Subjects  learned  their  winnings in cash at the end of each set of six rounds. 
The low-stake rounds  were followed by a set of six “high-stake" rounds,  where subjects started 
again  with  a clean slate:  full access to loans,  and  a hectare  of land  with  its original  value.   The 
procedures  and rules were exactly  the same as we described  earlier,  and  the  only change  was the 
increase in 100 percent in the exchange rate to compute the winnings in cash, as a way to incentivize 
more careful decisions.  Thus,  now for every 600 Soles of payoffs,  participants would receive 1 Sol 
in cash. 
After running  the baseline experiment,  the insurance  experiment was conducted;  we had again 
a set of 12 rounds with the insured loan project  (project C: cotton  with loan & insurance ) included 
in the  set  of  choices.   The  rules  and  procedures  followed in this  new experiment,  as well as the 
exchange  rates  used,  were exactly  the  same  as the ones described  above.   We  emphasized  with 
subjects  that the results from the baseline experiment (i.e., whether subjects defaulted on a loan or 
not) did not carry over to the insurance experiment. Written on 85 percent of the long-run average 
valley yields, insurance  pays out indemnities when valley yields fall below 31 quintals per hectare; 
i.e., when valley yields are “low" (30 quintals  per hectare)  or “very low" (23 quintals per hectare), 
which will happen when a black chip or a red chip are drawn in a valley.  We should note in Table 2 
that, since indemnity  payouts  cover exactly  the shortfalls  under  those sections of the distribution, 
the amount of the profits are the same for every category  of idiosyncratic  shock (150, 500 and 850 
Soles). 
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3.1 Participants Characteristics and Matrix of Choices 
 
The  main  characteristics of our  experimental  subjects  are  as follows:  Our  typical  experimental 
subject  is  older  than 50,  has  spent  half  of her  lifetime  managing  a  farm,  has  only  completed 
elementary  education  (six years of schooling),  owns 6 hectares,  sows 5 of them,  and  holds assets 
for twenty thousand Soles (about $7,000), as shown in Table  C.1 in the Appendix.   Moreover,  66 
percent of our subjects have access to any type of credit, only 14 percent of them have life insurance; 
and 10 percent,  have accident insurance.  Furthermore, on average,  subjects exhibit  a moderate  to 
high risk aversion.  We will examine more closely these variables  later  on. 
It  should  be mentioned  that, since we are interested in capturing the  choices that contain  the 
most information possible, the following analysis will use the last high stakes round at which subjects 
stopped learning about the  different projects,  which is the  last high stakes round  (if subjects did 
not fall in default) or the round immediately prior to the one in which subjects fell in default (given 
that immediately after  that  round,  subjects  are only left with  the  fallback project).  We call this 
round  the final unconstrained round.25 
Table  4 shows one of our main  results,  the  matrix  of project  choices made  by subjects  in the 
baseline experiment (indicated in rows) and in the insurance  experiment (in columns).  We observe 
at the bottom of column 5 that a large proportion (57 percent) of the experimental subjects chose 
the  insured  loan  project,  a  proportion  that was similar  in all of the  high  stakes  rounds.    (The 
average number  of switches in project choices is 0.80, with a standard deviation  of 1.31.)  Another  
interesting result  is that purchasing  insurance  seems to  have  encouraged  almost  14 percent  (52 
out  of 378) of subjects  to opt  for a loan  instead  of producing  using their  own resources  (see cell 
{B,C} in the matrix), thanks  to the reduction in the likelihood of default  implied by insurance.  An 
alternative reading  of the  same figure  indicates  that about  60 percent  (52 out  of 91) of the  risk 
rationed subjects (i.e., those who chose the fallback project in the baseline experiment26 ) switched 
to the  insured loan project  when it was available.   This  is an encouraging  result  that goes in line 
with  an  intended effects  of insurance:   to  encourage  farmers  to  undertake riskier  but  potentially 
more profitable projects. 
We  can  further  see in the  table  that a relatively  small  proportion of subjects  made  choices 
inconsistent with  transitivity in preferences.  In particular, 20 out of 91 subjects who selected the 
fallback  project  over the uninsured  loan project  in the  baseline  experiment  (cell {B,A}) switched 
to the  uninsured loan project in the  insurance  experiment,  and  14 out  of 287 subjects  who chose 
the  uninsured  loan in the baseline experiment (cell {A,B}) switched to the  fallback project in the 
insurance  experiment.  Note that since we are working with  the  final unconstrained rounds,  these 
choices were made before any bad year (i.e., a black chip drawn in a given round)  happened  when 
the  uninsured  loan was selected, and thereby they are likely to reflect  their  true  preferences.27 
 
 
2 5 During  the first high stake round of the insurance  game, 2.6 percent of sub jects went into default. 
2 6 Obviously,  we are assuming here that these sub jects are risk rationed in real life, a result that may not necessarily 
hold. 
2 7 Using the modal choice during  the high-stake rounds would result in a take-up  rate for the insured  (uninsured) 
loan of 58.5 percent (24.3 percent), and 37.6 percent of risk rationed sub jects, with 57 percent of them switching to 
the insured  loan in the Insurance  Game. 
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Table  4: Choices in Baseline and Insurance  Games 
 
 Insurance  Experiment 
Uninsured  loan 
(A) 
Fallback 
(B) 
Insured  loan 
(C) 
Total % 
 
B
as
el
in
e 
E
x
p
er
im
e
n
t 
Uninsured  loan (A) 
% 
109 
38.0 
14 
4.9 
164 
57.0 
287 
100.0 
75.9 
Fallback  (B) 
% 
20 
22.0 
19 
20.9 
52 
57.1 
91 
100.0 
24.1 
Total 
% 
129 
34.1 
33 
8.7 
216 
57.1 
378 
100.0 
100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Before we discuss the main distinctive  characteristics of subjects  in the baseline and insurance 
experiments,  we need  to  define  two  variables  of interest that were constructed from within  the 
experiments:   financial  literacy  and  risk  aversion.   In constructing  this  measure  of the  degree of 
comprehension  of the main features of the insured and uninsured  loans, we included four indicators:  
(i) self-reported  comprehension  of the farming experiment rules (variable  Self-report ), (ii) whether 
subjects knew (reminded) that insurance  indemnity payouts  depend on valley-wide average yields 
(Learn_ins1 ) and (iii) not on idiosyncratic shocks (Learn_ins2 ), and (iv) whether  they  knew the 
two consequences  of defaulting  on a loan (Learn_loan ).  We assigned  the  same weights  to each of 
these variables: 
 
F inancial literacy  = (Self -report + Learn_I ns1 + Learn_I ns2 + Learn_Loan)/4; 
 
 
where Self-report  takes the  values of 1, 0.75, 0.5, or 0.25 if subjects  claimed  that the instructions 
were “very easy",  “easy",  “hard", or “very  hard", respectively.  Learn_Ins1 and  Learn_Ins2 are 
indicator variables  that take the value of 1 if the answer was correct and 0, otherwise.  Learn_Loan 
takes the  value of 1 if the  two consequences of defaulting  an uninsured  loan (i.e., no future  access 
to loans and land depreciation) were indicated by subjects; 0.5 if only one of those were mentioned; 
and 0 otherwise.  We then  normalized  this  indicator  to take values between  0 (which means that a 
subject  does not  know anything about the  rules of the experiment) and  1 (which indicates  that a 
subject  knows very well the  rules).   The  average value of this  indicator  across subjects  is 0.54, 
which indicates  a moderate  level of comprehension overall.28 
In the  case of elicited  risk preferences,  risk parameters were estimated using the  results  of a 
lottery  experiment conducted with the same Pisco subjects.  The data  were fitted to Constant Rela- 
tive Risk Aversion (CRRA)  utility functions under Expected Utility Theory (EUT)  and Cumulative  
Prospect  Theory (CPT),29 resulting in average estimated CRRA coeficients of 0.45 (EUT)  and 0.74 
2 8 If we excluded  the self-reported  comprehension  variable  (self-report ),  such  an  indicator  would  have  an  average 
value of 0.50, and the correlation coeficient with education would be 0.37. 
2 9 Under EUT,  risk preferences are entirely defined by the curvature parameter, while in CPT,  a probability weight- 
ing function parameter also affects risk preferences.  This function captures the sub jective distortions made to actual 
probabilities.  More details of the estimation process are provided  in Section 4.1. 
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(CPT), estimates that suggest the existence of a moderate  to relatively high degree of risk aversion. 
The interested reader  is referred  to our companion  paper (Galarza, 2009) for details. 
 
3.2 Descriptive Analysis of Experiment Results 
 
This section examines the main characteristics exhibited  by our subjects in the Baseline Experiment 
and in the Insurance  Experiment, as a means to provide insight about the variables correlated  with 
the  demand  for  the insured  loan  that will be analyzed  in Section  4.  Since we are  interested in 
capturing  the choices that  contain  the most  information  possible,  the  following analysis  will use 
the  last high stakes round  at  which subjects stopped  learning  about  the  different projects,  which 
is the last high stakes round  (if subjects  did not fall in default)  or the round  immediately prior to 
the one in which subjects fell in default  (given that immediately after that round,  subjects are only 
left with the fallback project). We call this round  the final unconstrained round.30 
 
 
3.2.1 Baseline Experiment:  Risk-Rationed Subjects versus Uninsured Borrowers 
 
Table  C.2 in the Appendix  shows the means T -tests  of selected variables  for the two groups in the 
baseline experiment.  We  see that uninsured borrowers have a lower proportion  of females and own 
and  cultivate  bigger parcel sizes (by one hectare) than risk-rationed subjects.  The former group 
also appears to be more connected to agricultural information  networks, as indicated  by their bigger 
number of information partners; people within an information network exchange information  about 
farming  activities,  such as pests  control,  new seeds, and  the  like.  Uninsured  borrowers  also have 
a greater  access to loans from any source in real  life, especially from cotton  mills.  Furthermore, 
uninsured  borrowers  show a lower tendency  to overweight small probabilities, meaning  that when 
they  are  told  an event  has a small probability of happening  (e.g.,  1,  5, or 10 percent),  they  act 
as if  such event  were to happen  with  a higher  probability.31   We will  discuss in more detail  the 
effects of this type of psychological distortion of probability information  in Section 4. For all of the 
above indicated  variables,  the differences  in means between risk-rationed and uninsured borrowers 
are significant at either 1 or 5 percent. Our indicator of financial literacy is marginally greater for 
uninsured  borrowers.  The  formal education  levels and risk aversion  estimates shown by those two 
groups are statistically similar. 
In the  econometric  analysis  about  the  choices made in the insurance  experiment performed  in 
Section 4,  we will control for choices made  in the  baseline  experiment by including  the  predicted  
probability of choosing the fallback project  in this  experiment as a control variable,  which will in 
turn  be estimated as a linear function  of gender,  age, education, and owned land size variables. 
3 0 During  the first high stake round of the insurance  game, 2.6 percent of sub jects went into default. 
3 1 To illustrate  the notion  of overweighting  of small  probabilities,  let  us take  the case of a lottery,  whose chances 
of winning  its  biggest  prize  is say 0.001.  Now, let  us consider  that sub jects  transform  such  0.001 into  a sub jective 
probability  of 0.01; that is, they  behave  as if  they could get the highest prize weere bigger than it actually  is.  The 
consequence  of this  is that for a given curvature  of the  utility  function,  they  would  behave  in a more  risk  seeking 
manner  than such  curvature  would  suggest.   Levy and  Levy (2002)  nicely  analyze  the consequences  of probability 
weighting on the lotteries’ risk premium. 
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3.2.2 Insurance Experiment: Insured Borrowers versus the Others 
 
Comparing  insured borrowers to uninsured  borrowers and risk-rationed producers,  Table C.3 in the 
Appendix shows that insured borrowers are markedly different from the other two groups in several 
important respects:  demographics,  literacy,  productivity, assets, risk preferences, as well as market 
and social connections. 
First,  insured  borrowers  are  significantly  younger  (by two  years)  and  have  higher  education  
(by one year)  than  uninsured borrowers; and this gap is even bigger when we compare  insureds  to 
risk-rationed  subjects.   Second, insured  borrowers  are also more likely to have better understood  
the properties  of insurance  than  the other  two groups of subjects,  a result  reflected  by their  higher 
values of the  variable  Financial Literacy.   Third,  insureds  also report  higher  cotton  yields in the 
last farming season (2007-2008), though this difference is statistically significant (at 5 percent level) 
only when insureds  are compared  to risk-rationed subjects (the  gap is 6 quintals, or 276 Kilograms 
per  hectare).  Fourth, insureds  own more  valuable  assets,  denoted  by the variable  Wealth  (that 
includes  the values of land  and  house),  a result  that  is mainly  explained  by their  more valuable 
houses.  In fact,  insureds’  house values are 50 percent  higher  than  those  of uninsured  borrowers, 
and this gap is even larger when we compare  insured  to risk-rationed subjects. Furthermore, while 
insureds do have significantly bigger parcels than risk-rationed subjects (by one hectare), such gap 
vanishes when we compare  insureds  to uninsured  borrowers. 
Fifth,  surprisingly,  risk-rationed subjects  are more risk averse  than  uninsured  borrowers,  who 
are  in  turn more  risk  averse  than  insured  borrowers;  and  such  differences  in  risk  aversion  are 
statistically  significant (at 10 percent) under the EUT and the CPT specifications.  How can we 
explain this seemingly counterintuitive result?  In particular, why should higher risk averse subjects 
choose the uninsured loan instead of the insured  loan?:  The fact that (higher)  risk aversion under 
EUT and CPT  is highly correlated with a lower education  attainment and a lower financial literacy 
suggests that higher risk averse subjects are less likely to have understood the true dynamic benefits 
from buying  crop insurance.   Having a relatively  poor understanding of this  insurance,  risk averse 
subjects  would  thus  have  opted  for either  the  safest  (fallback)  project  or  a  project  they  know 
relatively  well in real life—the uninsured loan. 
Sixth, insured borrowers are also more likely to have obtained a loan to finance their agricultural 
activities than  risk-rationed subjects, but less likely so than  uninsured  borrowers  (significance at 5 
percent level).  Seventh, considering the number of experimentally-constructed valley members with 
whom an individual shares information  about farming activities  as an indicator  of social connection,  
we find  that insured  and  uninsured   borrowers  are  similarly  connected  with  other  farmers—the  
agricultural ‘networks’  have  on  average  1.7 members—while  groups  belong  to  a  slightly  bigger 
agricultural network than  risk-rationed farmers. Eighth, the winnings from the low stakes insurance 
experiment are (expectedly) higher for subjects choosing the insured  loan than those  obtained  by 
subjects  who chose the  fallback project.   Ninth, overweighting is the  greatest for those  who chose 
the  fallback  project,  and  lowest  for those  choosing  the  insured  loan.   Lastly,  we do not  observe 
statistically significant differences  in terms  of gender, farming experience, or belonging to a farmer 
association  amongst these three  groups. 
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iTo  sum  up  then,  we saw that financial  literacy,  wealth,  risk preferences,  and  social network 
variables  are  likely to  be correlated with  the  project  choices made  in the  insurance  experiment,  
and  we will  include  those  variables  in  the  regression  analysis.    We  discuss  in  the next  section 
the  econometric  methods  used  in the  estimation  of those  project  choice decisions and  the  main 
estimation results. 
 
 
4 Econometric Specification 
 
We estimate ordered  probit  models, using the choices made in the final unconstrained round.  The 
base  ordering  is given by risk considerations:  as risk aversion  increases,  one should  expect  to see 
subjects switching  from the uninsured  loan (riskiest)  to the insured  loan, and then  to the fallback 
project  (safest):  A→C→B.  Thus,  in our base econometric  specification,  the  dependent  variable, 
yi, which denotes  the project  choice by individual  i, will take the  value of 1, if the uninsured  loan 
project was chosen; 2, if it was the insured  loan project;  and 3, if it was the fallback project. 
Using the  latent utility  framework,  we define  y *   as an unobserved  measure  of utility  for indi- 
vidual  i:32 
 
 
y
*
i = X’iβ + εi                                                                                                                  (4) 
where εi will be assumed  to follow a logistic distribution, and X is the vector  of regressors.  Thus, 
for our three-category ordered  model we have that, 
 
 yi = j     if αj-1 < y
*
i ≤ αj,    j=1,2,3                                                         (5) 
 
with α0 = -∞ and α3 = ∞;  where the α
’
s  indicate  the  cut points  or thresholds  that define  the 
project  choice.   Using the  previous  two  equations,   the  probability  of choosing  project  j can  be 
expressed as follows: 
Pr (yi = j) = Pr (αj-1 < y
*
i ≤ αj)                                                          (6) 
= Pr (αj-1 - X’iβ < εi ≤ αj - X’iβ) 
= F (αj - X’iβ) – F (αj-1 - X’iβ), 
 
where F (.) is the cumulative  probability distribution of  εi. The parameter vector    and the cutpoint 
parameters    result from maximizing  the following log-likelihood function: 
 
 
ln L(α,β | X) = ΣNi=1Σ
 N
i=1 ln[F (αj - X’iβ) – F (αj-1 - X’iβ)]
yi,j                                  (7)
 
where yi,1 ; yi,2 ; yi,3  are  three  indicator  variables  with  yi,j  = 1 if yi  = j;  and  yi,j  = 0, otherwise. 
The  interpretation of the  regression  coeficients  is as follows:  Since the  project  choice used as a 
dependent variable  decreases with risk (a higher value is associated  with choosing a safer project), 
 
3 2 I am drawing  on Cameron  and Trivedi  (2009) for this part. 
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a positive  coeficient  βi would indicate  a higher  probability of choosing a safer project.   We run 
ordered  probit  regressions  with  the  standard errors  clustered  by the  experimentally-constructed- 
valleys,  in order  to  correct  for a possible  intra-cluster  correlation. We also include  session fixed 
effects in the regressions, in order to control for intra-session correlated  decisions.  The next section 
discusses the estimation results. 
 
 
4.1 Empirical Analysis 
 
In this  section  we examine  the  main  determinants  of project  choice in the  high stakes  insurance 
experiment. In particular, we analyze the main predictors  of choosing the riskiest project (uninsured 
loan) instead of any of the other two safer projects (insured loan or fallback project).  We will discuss 
the  effects  of  wealth,  financial  literacy,  social connections,  and  variables  constructed  from within 
the experiments (choices in the baseline experiment, winnings in the low stakes rounds,  experiment 
effects,  and risk aversion). 
The  base specification includes the  following independent variables:  the  level of assets, a vari- 
able measuring  the  degree of social connection  existing in the experimentally-constructed valleys, 
the  predicted choices made  in the  Baseline Experiment, low-stakes winnings in the  Insurance  Ex- 
periment,  and a variable that controls for the potential existence of a source of judgment bias called 
“hot-hand” effect,  which may  arise from an attempt to discover trends in past information, and 
results in an overestimation of the autocorrelation in the series of good or bad events 
Our variable Wealth  includes the value of land and house, while our social connection variable— 
Agricultural  Network — indicates  the  number  of subjects  in a given randomly-formed valley with 
whom a  person  shares  information about  farming  activities.33    This  variable  also controls  for po- 
tentially  correlated  decisions within  each experimental valley.34    On the  other  hand,  the  variable 
that predicts choices made in the  baseline experiment—Risk Rationed — indicates  the  probability 
of choosing the  fallback  project  in that  experiment,35 and  intends  to  account  for the  potential 
correlation  between choices in the insurance  experiment and those in the baseline experiment.  The 
variable  Prior Rounds Earnings, which measures  the winnings in Soles from the low stakes rounds 
in the  insurance  experiment, controls for “wealth" effects  that could have arisen if project choices 
depended  on how much winnings they earned  in the prior rounds  of the insurance  experiment. 
Finally,  we control  for the  potential existence  of a source of judgment  bias called “hot-hand” 
effect,  which may arise from an attempt to discover trends in past  information  and  results  in an 
overestimation  of  the  autocorrelation  in the  series of good or bad  events.36     Focusing  solely on 
negative  events,  this  bias  would  imply  that, for instance,   drawing  two  consecutive  black  chips 
3 3 Including  demographic  indicators would not change the results significantly. 
3 4 While  it could  have  been  interesting  to capture  the way information  is aggregated  within  different  valleys  and 
how it is then translated into decisions under risk, by simply including the size of the agricultural network, we expect 
to control for the influence that the members  within a valley may have had on each individual’s pro ject choices. 
3 5 We estimated  a Probit regression  of the unconstrained  final  high  stakes  round  in the baseline  game  on age (in 
years),  education (years),  gender, and owned land size (in hectares). 
3 6 Offerman and  Sonnemans  (2004)  report  some evidence  of the overrreaction  resulting  from  hot-hand effects 
in sports  and  financial  markets.   They  further  desing  an  experiment  to distinguigh  between  hot-hand  and  
recency effects, the latter being the bias towards overweighting recent information and underweighting prior  beliefs. 
 
 
 
19 
(which  means  that a very low average  yield was drawn  in a particular farming  season)  may lead 
subjects  to  erroneously  think  that those  events  are autocorrelated and  would then  drive them  to 
rely on a safe project (i.e., either the fallback or the insured loan projects).  This overreaction notion 
is closely related  to the overweighting of probabilities information, in the sense that the probability 
of a bad recent event is overvalued,  thus resulting  in a too optimistic or too pessimistic  behavior. 
To  control for this  “hot-hand”effect, we use a dummy  variable  for drawing  two  consecutive 
black chips in the last two low stakes rounds of the Insurance  Experiment, and we expect a positive 
(negative) correlation with the safer projects (insured loan or fallback project) take-up if there is an 
overestimation  (underestimation) of the autocorrelation in the series of black chips:  once two black 
chips are drawn, those subjects overestimating (underestimating) such autocorrelation would (not)  
expect  another  black  chip  to  be  drawn  in the  next  rounds,  thus  judging  the insured  loan or the 
fallback  project—choices  which eliminate  the  chances  of a loan  default  if a black  chip  is 
drawn—more  (less) attractive than  the uninsured  loan. 
In addition  to those  controls,  we are particularly interested in examining  the  effect  that risk 
preferences,  education, and  financial literacy  can have over the  project  selection  in the  Insurance 
Experiment.   Our  risk  variable  was estimated from  a  Holt-Laury  (2002)  type  of binary  lottery 
experiment  in which  the  same  sample  of subjects  chose between  a relatively  safe lottery  and  a 
relatively  risky lottery  along ten decision rows.   Prizes  are  held  constant  in each row, while the 
probability of the higher prize in each lottery  decreases as the  experiment progresses.  The  idea of 
this  design is that, unless  subjects  are extremely  risk loving, they  should  start choosing the safe 
lottery  and  switch to the risky  lottery before or in the 10th  row, where the  prize from the  risky 
lottery  is for sure greater  than  that from  the  safe lottery.   Lottery  choices were used to estimate 
risk preferences  by maximum  likelihood.   Results  from that experiment  are  reported  in Galarza 
(2009).   In  the  risk  regression,  higher  education  appears  significantly  correlated  with  lower risk 
aversion.   On  the  other  hand,  our  Financial Literacy   indicator  intends  to capture the  level of 
subjects’ comprehension  about the main  features  of the  insured  and uninsured  loan projects,  and 
takes values between 0 (meaning  that subjects  do not 
know anything  about  the  insured  and  uninsured  loan projects)  and  1 (meaning  that subjects 
know very well those projects). 
Turning  to  the  regression  results  shown in Table  5, in all four specifications  considered,  the 
variables  that enter  with  significant  coeficients  are  the  probability  of being  risk  rationed, our 
indicator  of ‘hot-hand’ effect, and risk aversion.  First,  being risk rationed  in the baseline experiment 
makes subjects to be more likely to choose the  safer projects  in the  insurance  experiment as well. 
This  result  should  not  be  surprising  and  simply points  to the  consistency  in choices across these 
two types of experiments. Moreover, if one suspects  that there  is some endogeneity issues with the 
inclusion of this variable,  given that, after  all, choices made by subjects in the baseline game may 
be correlated with some other  observable  characteristics that also explain choices in the insurance 
experiment,   it  should  be mentioned  that excluding  this  variable  does not  affect  the  qualitative 
results  under  the four specifications considered. 
Second, we find that subjects appear to underestimate the autocorrelation of very bad covariate 
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shocks, since once they  face two  consecutive  black chips in their  valleys they  tend  to choose the 
risky project  instead  of the safer ones (presumably because they do not expect the next  season to 
face another black chip).  This  effect  is significant (p-values  < 0.06 in specifications [1], [2], & [3], 
and p-value < 0.05 in specification [4]). 
Third,  interestingly, our risk estimate  appears  to have a quadratic, concave relationship with 
project choices: higher risk aversion is positively correlated  with a higher demand  for safer projects, 
but such relationship is decreasing.  This  non-linear  relationship hints  that the highest  risk averse 
subjects  would  prefer  switching  to  the  riskier  project,  a result  that is rather puzzling.   Taking 
specification  [1] alone (see  column 2), we could explain this result noting that highly risk averse 
subjects are more likely to have lower financial literacy  (Spearman’s correlation  coeficient of -0.26, 
significant at 1 percent), and we could thus think that higher risk averse subjects, being less likely to 
have understood  the intertemporal and dynamic benefits of insurance,  will have a lower demand  for 
it.  However, when we control for financial literacy  (specification [2] in column 2), the  relationship 
between risk aversion and project choice remains basically the same, meaning that financial literacy 
does not  explain  project  choices.  It  is rather surprising  not  to find  that financial  literacy  affects 
project  choice (though  its coeficient  has a positive  sign, meaning  that higher  financially  literate  
subjects  are  more prone  to  select the safer projects  (in particular, the  insured  loan project),  its 
magnitude is negligible and statistically insignificant.  We also tried to see if there  was a non-linear 
relationship, or if the individual  components of this indicator  were significant, but did not find any 
evidence of it. 
We further  examined  whether the interaction between financial literacy  and risk aversion could 
predict project choice (for some moderate degrees of risk aversion and financial literacy), but while 
neither financial literacy  nor its interaction term  with risk aversion resulted  statistically significant 
(see specification  [3] in  column  4),  and  the  standard errors  of those  variables  become  large.   In 
this  case, risk aversion enters  with a significant coeficient (at  10 percent), and  its quadratic term 
continues  to be significant at  5 percent (p-value  is 0.015).  In all specifications where risk aversion 
is included,  its linear term and its quadratic expression are jointly statistically significant at either 
the 10 percent (specification [3]) or 1 percent (specifications [1] & [2]). 
Things are different when we include education (expressed in years) instead of financial literacy in 
the  regression,  and  we exclude  the  risk  estimates   (we  did  so because  the estimation  of the risk 
preferences included dummy variables of education—illiterate, some primary, and some post- 
secondary education—and including both education  and risk would confound the effect of education  
on project  choice).   Results  in  this  case,  reported  in  column  (5),  indicate  that higher  levels of 
education  are strongly correlated  with a higher propensity  to stay away from the risky, uninsured  
loan project.  The qualitative results in terms of the other regressors remain unchanged  with respect 
to specifications [1] & [2]. 
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Table  5: Ordered  Probit Results  for Project Choice 
Regressions weighted  by the inverse of the risk estimate variance 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wealth  (10,000 Soles) 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.022 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) 
Financial  Literacy  Indicator  0.008 1.065  
  (0.408) (0.812)  
Education (years)    0.039 
    (0.015)** 
Number  of Peers in Agric Network -0.078 -0.078 -0.082 -0.073 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) 
Est.Probability of Being Risk Rationed1 0.738 0.739 0.760 0.746 
 
Prior  Rounds  Earnings–Soles2 
(0.209)*** 
-0.092 
(0.208)*** 
-0.092 
(0.207)*** 
-0.075 
(0.210)*** 
-0.089 
 
Two Black Chips,  Insurance  Experiment3 
(0.102) 
-0.613 
(0.103) 
-0.613 
(0.102) 
-0.585 
(0.104) 
-0.641 
 (0.316)* (0.316)* (0.307)* (0.318)** 
CRRA  Estimate under  EUT4 0.747 0.749 2.589  
 (0.680) (0.721) (1.474)*  
CRRA  Estimate Squared -1.922 -1.922 -2.045  
 (0.944)** (0.951)** (0.986)**  
CRRA  Estimate * Financial   -2.570  
Literacy  (1.678)y 
Mean of dependent variable  0.57 
Number  of Observations 350 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.126 0.126 0.131 0.124 
* (**) [***] denotes  significance at 10% (5%) [1%] level. y P-value  of 0.126. 
Robust  standard errors clustered  by the experimentally-constructed-valleys are reported  in parenthesis. 
All regressions include session fixed effects. 
1  Estimated using a Probit  model with age, education, gender and land size as independent variables. 
2  In low stakes Insurance  Experiment. 3  Indicator variable  for drawing two black chips in the last two 
low stakes rounds.  4  CRRA  estimated assuming  Expected  Utility  Theory-EUT with Fechner  errors. 
 
 
We should mention that the aforementioned qualitative results hold even when we consider that 
the errors follow a logistic distribution (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). Regression results considering 
the  risk and overweighting parameters estimated under  CPT  as independent variables  turned out 
to  be less clear.   In  particular, both  variables  enter  the  regression  with  statistically  insignificant 
coeficients.  Moreover, the estimation of a quadratic shape of the relationship between risk aversion 
and project choice gets complicated by the fact that the standard errors become extremely  large. 
 
 
4.1.1 Robustness Checks 
 
In progress... 
 
   We could consider  an alternative ordering  in choices, this  time  corresponding  to  the  mean 
total projects’ profits (which coincides with the projects’ complexity). 
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–  Not yet done. 
 
   Non-linear  relationship with the financial literacy  variable  (get 3 quantiles  of the density,  and 
include dummy  variables  for the lowest two) 
 
–  Result:  Financial  literacy  is still insignificant, and results  are basically the same. 
 
   Non-linear  relationship with the risk preferences estimate  (get 3 quantiles  of the density, and 
include dummy  variables  for the lowest two) 
 
–  Result:  Same as using quadratic shape. 
 
   Only including  the subsample  of those who did not switch back and forth  in the risk experi- 
ment. 
 
–  Result:  Quadratic shape is not significant, financial literacy becomes significant (at 5%), 
wealth (1%), still significant hot-hand effect. 
 
   Excluding those who mistakenly  chose the safe lottery  in the 10th row of the risk experiment. 
 
–  Result:   Quadratic shape is not  significant,  hot  hand  effect  is significant  and  prob.   of 
being risk rationed  becomes significant (at  5%). 
 
   Excluding those subjects who chose {project A, project B} & {project B, project A} (switched 
from safe/loan [baseline experiment]  to loan/safe [in insurance  experiment],  see Table  4). 
 
–  Result:  It only makes risk estimates more significant (and  wealth  becomes significant). 
 
 
5 (Preliminary) Conclusion 
 
In a context  of collateral-constrained formal  credit  markets,  the  introduction of insurance  is ex- 
pected to help enhance the demand  for credit by reducing the fear of losing collateral  that prevents 
potential borrowers from taking  loans.  This paper provides experimental evidence of such desired 
credit  crowding-in  effect  of  insurance  from Peru.   Framing  our experiments  to  recreate  a similar 
environment to the choices and outcomes that farmers have in real life, we started with a Baseline 
Experiment where subjects had to choose between a fallback (safe) production project or produce 
using  an  uninsured  working  capital  loan  (risky  project).    We  then  introduced  a third project— 
producing  cotton  with  an  insured  loan—which  allows  us  to  measure  the  effect  of insurance  on 
the  demand  for loans  (Insurance Experiment).   Our  results  show  that while about  a quarter of 
our subjects  are risk rationed, meaning  that they  chose to do the  fallback project in the  baseline 
experiment,  about  60 percent  of those  subjects  switched to the  insured  loan project  when it was 
available. 
Overall,  in the  Insurance  Experiment, more than  50 percent of the  subjects  chose the  insured 
loan during  the high stakes rounds.  Given that this  insurance  contract eliminates  by construction 
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the  chance of loan default,  this  demand  is likely to reflect the fear of losing collateral  when one is 
unable  to  repay a loan.  While one could suspect  that this  very high insurance  take-up  rate  may 
simply  reflect  subjects’  desire to  “try that new product" out  of curiosity,  there  are  two  reasons 
to  believe that this  was  not  the  case.   First,  the  insured  loan take-up  does not  vary  much  even 
during the low stakes rounds.  Second, and more interestingly, using contingent valuation questions 
in the post-experiment  survey,  we  verify  that indeed  about  55 percent  of farmers  indicated that 
they would be willing to buy the insured  loan contract with the premium  of 150 Soles per hectare. 
The econometric results of the main predictors of project choice show that, controlling for wealth 
and choices in the baseline experiment, project choice is affected by a ‘hot-hand’ effect that stem 
from an underestimation in the autocorrelation in the sequence of very bad years (or black chips), 
while the relationship with risk aversion appears  to have a quadratic shape.  That is, only low and 
moderately  risk averse subjects will choose the safest projects  (i.e., fallback or insured  loan), while 
highly risk averse farmers will more likely choose the risky, uninsured  loan project.  Although  there 
is certainly  more  work to  do in  order  to  fully understand this  result,  this  preliminary evidence 
should  be taken  as suggestive  of the  usefulness  of exploring  some departures from the  standard 
microeconomic theory. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature about the use of behavioral  field experiments to 
predict financial decisions made in a risky environment. A novel feature of our experimental design is 
that it involves  choices over alternative projects related to agricultural production decisions, 
whose profits depend on the realizations  of two random  shocks: one intended  to show the effects of 
covariate,  systemic  variables,  and  the other,  the  effects  of idiosyncratic factors.   Another  possible 
use of our experimental design is in the  education  of potential beneficiaries  of virtually  any new 
financial product. 
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Appendix A. Information Shared with Subjects 
 
 
1.  Number  and  color of chips by type  of valley-wide average  yields (VAYs):  black, red,  white, 
blue, green 
 
2.  Historical  valley-wide average cotton  yields: 1986-2006 (bar  graph) 
 
3.  Project  A  (cotton   with  loan)  payoffs  for the  normal  individual  luck  (luck  dimension  not 
shown) by type of VAY 
 
4.  Example  of calculating  the payoffs for the normal individual  luck (luck dimension not shown) 
with normal  VAY 
 
5.  Number  and color of balls by type of individual  luck: purple,  white, yellow 
 
6.  Project  A’s payoffs  (by type of luck and category  of VAY) 
 
7.  Project  B’s payoffs (by type of luck and category  of VAY) 
 
8.  Project  A’s and B’s payoffs (by type of luck and category  of VAY) on the same page 
 
9.  Project  C’s payoffs (by type of luck and category  of VAY) 
 
10.  Project  A’s, B’s & C’s payoffs (by type of luck and category  of VAY) on the same page 
 
{End  of Farming  experiments} 
 
11.  Maximum  and minimum  prizes of lotteries 
 
12.  Lotteries’ payoffs  for decision row 2 
 
13.  Lotteries’ payoffs  for decision row 8 (symmetric to 2) 
 
14.  Lotteries’ payoffs  for decision rows 2 and 8 (together) 
 
15.  Practice experiment sheet for binary  lottery  experiment (ten  decision rows) 
 
16.  Experiment sheet for high-stake  binary  lottery  experiment (ten  decision rows) 
 
{End  of Lottery  Experiment} 
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Appendix B. Summary of Experimental  Procedures 
 
 
The following is the structure of the farming experiments  conducted  in Pisco. 
 
   Entry survey 
 
   Introduction of the experimental session 
 
   Presentation of the experiment:  goals 
 
   Description  of project A: cotton  with loan 
 
–  Description  of Covariate  shock: valley-wide average yield (VAY),  slide 
 
   Examples  of how different colored chips represent distinct  types of VAY 
   Example  of how different colored chips imply different profits, slide 
   Example  of how the payoff for the normal  VAY was calculated,  slide 
 
–  Description  of Idiosyncratic shock: individual  luck, slide 
 
   Example  of how different colored balls (and  different colored chips) imply 
different profits for project  A (uninsured loan) 
 
–  Example  of drawing  a valley chip and an individual  luck (see profits), slide 
 
   Description  of project B: cotton  without loan (fallback),  slide 
 
–  Example  of drawing  a valley chip and an individual  luck (see profits) 
 
   Comparison  of outcomes  in projects A and B, slide 
 
–  Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual  luck (compare  profits if project were 
chosen A versus profits if  project B were chosen) 
 
   Play six rounds  of low stakes, baseline experiment (A versus B) 
 
–  Payments are calculated  and shown to subjects 
 
   Play six rounds  of high stakes, baseline experiment (A versus B) 
 
–  Payments are calculated  and shown to subjects 
 
   Description  of project C: cotton  with loan and index insurance,  slide 
 
–  A salient feature:  no default loans under  any  covariate  shock or idiosyncratic shock 
–  Example  of drawing  a valley chip and an individual  luck (see profits) 
 
   Comparison  of outcomes  in projects A, B, and C, slide 
 
–  Example of drawing a valley chip and an individual  luck (compare  profits if project were 
chosen A versus profits if  projects B or C were chosen) 
 
   Play six rounds  of low stakes, insurance  experiment (A versus B versus C) 
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–  Payments are calculated  and shown to subjects 
 
   Play six rounds  of high stakes, insurance  experiment (A versus B versus C) 
 
–  Payments are calculated  and shown to subjects 
 
   End  of Farming  Experiments 
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 Appendix C. Tables 
 
Table  C.1 Summary  Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. N 
Dependent  variable    
Insured  loan take-up  rate  (high stakes) 0.57 0.49 378 
Demographics  and Education    
Age (years) 54.9 13.3 367 
Aged less than 40 0.14 0.35 367 
Aged between than  40 and 50 0.19 0.39 367 
Aged between than  50 and 60 0.33 0.47 367 
Aged over 60 0.33 0.47 367 
Female  (Yes=1) 0.27 0.44 367 
Education (years) 6.33 4.11 365 
Illiterate 0.05 0.23 365 
Some primary  school 0.51 0.50 365 
Some secondary  school 0.34 0.47 365 
Completed higher than  secondary  school 0.09 0.29 365 
Financial  literacy  indicator1 0.54 0.20 378 
Agriculture  and Assets    
Farming  experience (years) 23.9 12.7 368 
Size of owned agricultural plot (hectares) 6.03 5.57 367 
Size of sown land (hectares)2 5.01 4.13 365 
Cotton yields (quintals  per hectare)2 46.8 14.8 293 
Self-reported  value of owned ag plot (000 Soles) 7.43 8.78 307 
Self-reported  value of house (000 Soles) 15.92 21.0 321 
Self-reported  value of assets (000 Soles)3 20.42 21.8 362 
Networks,  Credit,  and Insurance    
Talked  to somebody in her “valley"  about farming(Yes=1) 0.67 0.47 378 
Number  of “valley"  members in her agricultural network 1.73 1.61 378 
Has ever been a local authority (Yes=1) 0.39 0.49 365 
Belongs to a farmer  association  (Yes=1) 0.29 0.46 364 
Got credit  for farming activities (Yes=1)2 0.61 0.49 378 
Got formal credit  (Yes=1) 0.38 0.49 232 
Got credit  from cotton  mills (Yes=1) 0.28 0.45 232 
Has life insurance  (Yes=1) 0.14 0.37 367 
Has Accident insurance  (Yes=1) 0.10 0.30 367 
Experimental Variables    
Risk rationed  (Baseline  Experiment) (Yes=1) 0.24 0.43 378 
Risk parameter estimate, EUT4 0.45 0.29 365 
Risk parameter estimate, CPT4 0.74 0.32 365 
Probability weighting parameter estimate, CPT5 0.54 0.21 365 
Overweighting  small probabilities (Yes=1), CPT5 0.80 0.40 365 
Drew two black chips,last  low-stake rounds  Insurance  Experiment 0.02 0.13 378 
Winnings  from low stakes Insurance  Experiment (Soles) 3.04 0.85 378 
1  Indicator calculated using knowledge of insurance  and loan project,  as well as a self-reported  degree of 
comprehension. 2  It refers to the 2007-2008 farming  season.  3  Wealth  includes the values of land & house. 
4  EUT  (CPT): Risk estimate assuming  Expected Utility  Theory  (Cumulative  Prospect Theory). 
5  Overweighting means that the probability weighting  parameter is less than or equal to 0.7. 
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Table  C.2: Summary  Statistics by Project  Choice in Final  Unconstrained Round 
Baseline  Experiment 
 
Name  Uninsured  Loan (A)  Fallback  (B)  T-Test 
 
 Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N (A)=(B) 
Demographics  and Education        
Age (years) 54.6 0.80 278 55.9 1.39 89 -0.80 
Young (age < 40) 0.14 0.02 279 0.12 0.04 89 0.48 
Middle (age:  [50-60]) 0.34 0.03 279 0.33 0.05 89 0.19 
Old (age > 60) 0.33 0.03 279 0.36 0.05 89 -0.57 
Female 0.24 0.03 279 0.36 0.05 89 -2.15** 
Education (years) 6.35 0.25 279 6.27 0.45 86 0.17 
Illiterate 0.05 0.21 279 0.09 0.29 86 -1.37* 
Some primary  school 0.51 0.50 279 0.50 0.50 86 0.20 
Some secondary  school 0.35 0.48 279 0.30 0.46 86 0.85 
Higher than  second.  school 0.09 0.29 279 0.10 0.31 86 -0.40 
Financial  literacy  indicator 0.55 0.20 286 0.51 0.20 92 1.49* 
Agriculture  and Assets        
Farm  experience (years) 23.4 12.6 279 25.4 13.1 89 -1.27 
Size of owned land (Has) 6.28 0.36 278 5.24 4.17 89 1.85** 
Size of sown land (Has)1 5.23 4.15 277 4.32 4.02 88 1.83** 
Cotton yields (QQ/ Ha.)1 47.4 14.4 230 44.8 16.2 63 1.12 
Land value (000 Soles) 7.64 9.39 235 6.76 6.42 72 0.91 
House value (000 Soles) 15.44 19.65 241 17.35 24.32 80 -0.63 
Wealth  (000 Soles) 20.14 20.84 274 21.30 24.83 88 -0.40 
Networks and Credit        
Belongs to ag network 0.71 0.45 287 0.56 0.50 91 2.56*** 
# members  in ag network 1.82 1.60 287 1.44 1.62 91 1.97** 
Has been local authority 0.40 0.49 277 0.35 0.48 88 0.88 
Belongs to farm association 0.27 0.45 277 0.36 0.48 87 -1.47* 
Got credit  for farming activities 0.66 0.48 286 0.48 0.50 92 3.01*** 
Got formal credit 0.36 0.48 188 0.50 0.51 44 -1.71** 
Got credit  from a cotton  mill 0.31 0.46 188 0.14 0.35 44 2.76*** 
Experimental Outcomes 
Risk estimate under  EUT2 
 
 
0.44 
 
 
0.30 
 
 
280 
 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
85 
 
 
0.48 
Risk estimate under  CPT2 0.73 0.33 280 0.77 0.31 85 0.92 
Prob.  weighting parameter est., CPT 0.54 0.21 280 0.52 0.20 85 0.81 
Overweighting  small probabilities, CPT3 0.78 0.42 280 0.87 0.34 85 -1.86** 
Drew two black chips, low-stake  rounds4 0.02 0.13 287 0.01 0.10 91 0.43 
Winnings,  low stakes Insurance  Experiment5 3.07 0.88 287 2.96 0.73 91 1.07 
   (     ) [      ]:  Significant at 10% (5%) [1%] level. T-test  assumes unequal  variances. 
1  It refers to the 2007-2008 farming season. 
2  EUT  (CPT): Risk estimate assuming  Expected Utility  Theory  (Cumulative  Prospect Theory). 
3  Overweighting means that the probability weighting  parameter under  CPT  is less than  or equal to 0.7. 
4  In last two low-stake rounds  of Insurance  Experiment. 5  Expressed  in Soles. 
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Table  C.3:  Summary  Statistics by Project  Choice in Final  Unconstrained Round 
Insurance  Experiment 
 
Name  Insured  Loan (C)  Uninsured  Loan (A)  T-Test  Fallback  (B)  T-Test 
 
Mean S.D. N  Mean S.D. N (C)=(A) Mean S.D. N (C)=(B) 
Demographics  and Education            
Age (years) 53.8 13.2 210 56.0 56.5 124 -1.51* 57.9 14.6 33 -1.53* 
Young 0.15 0.36 211 0.13 0.34 124 0.56 0.09 0.29 33 1.07 
Middle 0.35 0.48 211 0.31 0.46 124 0.83 0.33 0.48 33 0.19 
Old 0.29 0.45 211 0.37 0.49 124 -1.44* 0.45 0.51 33 -1.72* 
Female 0.26 0.44 211 0.26 0.44 124 0.05 0.33 0.48 33 -0.82 
Education (years) 6.8 4.1 210 5.8 4.1 122 2.08** 5.6 3.9 33 1.61* 
Illiterate 0.04 0.20 210 0.07 0.25 122 -0.87 0.12 0.33 33 -1.32* 
Some primary  school 0.47 0.50 210 0.58 0.50 122 -2.03** 0.52 0.50 33 -0.51 
Some second.school 0.39 0.49 210 0.27 0.45 122 2.19** 0.30 0.47 33 0.94 
> second.school 0.10 0.31 210 0.08 0.28 122 0.70 0.06 0.24 33 0.94 
Financial  literacy 0.56 0.19 216 0.51 0.21 129 2.09** 0.50 0.22 33 1.46* 
Agriculture  and Assets            
Farm  experience1 23.4 12.7 211 24.2 12.1 124 -0.53 26.0 14.9 33 -0.93 
Size, owned land2;3 6.1 6.3 210 6.3 4.8 124 -0.35 4.9 3.1 33 1.69** 
Size of sown land2;3 5.05 4.2 210 5.2 4.0 123 -0.41 3.8 4.2 32 1.53* 
Cotton yields-QQ/Ha2 47.9 15.2 163 46.3 14.7 106 0.89 41.9 11.5 24 2.31** 
Land value4 7.73 10.90 173 7.30 5.01 107 0.44 6.08 4.07 27 1.44* 
House value4 18.65 25.76 185 12.37 16.48 108 2.93*** 11.48 9.52 28 2.75*** 
Wealth4 23.13 26.66 207 17.08 12.34 124 2.80*** 15.67 10.86 31 2.78*** 
Networks and Credit            
Belongs to agricult.            
network 0.69 0.46 216 0.70 0.46 129 -0.15 0.48 0.51 33 2.18** 
# members  netwk 1.75 1.58 216 1.82 1.65 129 -0.42 1.27 1.63 33 1.56* 
Has ever been a             
local authority 0.39 0.49 209 0.36 0.48 124 0.53 0.50 0.51 32 -1.12 
Belongs to a farm            
association 0.30 0.46 208 0.27 0.45 124 0.56 0.28 0.46 32 0.25 
Got credit 0.59 0.49 216 0.70 0.46 129 -2.00** 0.42 0.50 33 1.88** 
Formal  credit 0.41 0.49 128 0.38 0.49 90 0.42 0.21 0.43 14 1.58* 
From  cotton  mill 0.27 0.44 128 0.27 0.44 90 -0.02 0.43 0.51 14 -1.14 
Experimental Outcomes            
Risk rationed5 0.24 0.43 216 0.16 0.36 129 1.98** 0.58 0.50 33 -3.64*** 
Risk estimate  EUT 0.42 0.29 210 0.47 0.29 122 -1.59* 0.51 0.30 33 -1.53* 
Risk estimate  CPT 0.71 0.33 210 0.78 0.32 122 -1.85** 0.79 0.28 33 -1.56* 
Prob.weighting param. 0.55 0.21 210 0.52 0.21 122 1.43* 0.51 0.18 33 1.38* 
Overweight low prob.6 0.78 0.41 210 0.81 0.39 122 -0.67 0.88 0.33 33 -1.52* 
Drew two black chips7 0.005 0.07 216 0.03 0.17 129 -1.65* 0.03 0.17 33 0.84 
Winnings,  low stakes8 3.11 0.79 216 3.06 0.95 129 0.48 2.58 0.63 33 4.31*** 
* (**) [***] Significant at 10% (5%) [1%] level. T-tests  assume unequal  variances. 
1  Units  are years.  2  For farming season 2007-2008. 3  In hectares.  4  Units  are thousand Soles. 5  In the 
Baseline Experiment.6  Overweighting means that the probability weighting  parameter is less than 0.7. 
7  In last two low-stake rounds  Insurance  Experiment. 8  In low stakes Insurance  Experiment(expressed in Soles). 
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 From whom did 
you receive the TA 
or T? 
>> Table 1 
The TA or T 
was? 
>> Table 2 
TA 1   
TA 2   
T 1   
T 2   
Appendix D. Surveys  Conducted 
 
 
 
D.1 Entry Survey 
 
I. General Information 
1. Name 
2. Gender 
3. What  is your age? 
4. How many children  younger than  15 years of age currently  live in your household? 
5. How many completed years of education  do you have? 
6. The person with the most education  in your household,  how many completed years of education  
does he or she have? 
7. How many years have you dedicated  to agricultural activities? 
8. How many hectares  does your household  own? 
9. How many hectares  did you work in the past year? 
10.  How much  do you think  you would have to pay to rent a hectare  of land with  similar  charac- 
teristics to those of your principal  cotton  parcel? 
 
Row by 
row, 
mark 
with an 
X the 
space 
that 
correspo 
nds to 
the 
subject’s 
answer. 
11.1 Did 
you 
plant 
cotton in 
the 
years 
(fi )? 
11.2 
What 
were 
your 
cotton 
yields in 
the 
years 
()? 
(QQ x 
Ha) 
11.3 
Do you believe that 
your cotton yields in 
the years () were () than 
those of other farmers 
in your neighborhood? 
11.4. In the years (fi ), did youfi 
A. 
Become 
sick or 
injured? 
B. 
Suffer any 
kind of 
theft? 
(Seeds, 
cotton, 
pesticides, 
etc.) 
C. 
Suffer a 
problem 
with the 
climate? 
D. 
Suffer an 
infestation 
or blight 
in your 
cotton 
crop? 
E. 
Have 
problems 
with the 
irrigation 
infrastructure 
in your area? 
ye 
s 
N 
o 
Highe 
r 
Equal Less Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
2007• 
2008 
                
2006• 
2007 
                
2005• 
2006 
                
 
12. During  the  past 5 years,  did you receive any type of technical  assistance  (TA) or training (T) 
related  to the production  of cotton? 
If no, continue  to question  14. If yes, continue  to 13. 
13. Describe the last two TA or T that you received? 
Table 1 
1. Cotton gin 
2. Other private business 
3. NGO 
4. Ministry of Agriculture 
5. Other? Who? 
Table 2 
1.Very  beneficial 
2. beneficial 
3. Somewhat 
beneficial 
4. Not beneficial 
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II. Social Capital 
14. Are you or have you ever been any kind of authority of some association,  in your community, 
or irrigation  commission? 
15. Do you currently  belong to any association  of farmers? 
 
III. Insurance 
 
Row by row, 
mark with an X 
the space that 
corresponds to 
the subject’s 
answer. 
16.1 
Do you 
know 
what () 
insurance 
is? 
 
yes, quest. 
16.2 
No, quest. 
16.3 
16.2 
Do you have to pay 
for (fi ) insurance? 
16.3 
Do you or 
does anyone 
in your 
household 
have (fi ) 
insurance? 
 
yes, Q. 16.4 
No, Q. 16.5 
16.4 
If so, does 
this person 
pay for the 
(fi ) 
insurance? 
16.5 
Do you know 
who delivers 
the services of 
() insurance? 
16.6 
Only if they 
respond 
YES to 
question 
16.1 
Do you 
know what 
benefits you 
receive from 
(fi ) 
insurance? 
 
(Table 3) 
T
h
e 
p
u
b
li
c 
se
ct
o
r 
T
h
e 
C
aj
a 
ru
ra
l 
o
r 
a 
b
an
k
 
In
su
ra
n
ce
 c
o
m
p
an
y
 
D
o
 n
o
t 
k
n
o
w
 
Yes No Yes No Doesn 
’t 
know 
Yes No Yes No 
Health               
Accidents               
Life/burial/ 
funeral 
              
Debt               
Other?  Which?               
Table 3 
1. Free or less expensive medical attention in case of an 
accident 
2. Gives my family money should I pass away. 
3. Medical attention in a hospital 
4. Pays my debts if I pass them to my next of kin 
5. Pays for my burial and/or funeral, 
 
 
17. Would you be interested in paying a monthly premium to an institution in exchange for receiving 
a payment ONLY in the case that you: 
     Are ill or injured 
     Suffer  an infestation or blight in your crops 
     Suffer  a problem  with the climate  (e.g., drought) 
     Suffer  problems  with the irrigation  infrastructure 
 
 
 
D.2 Exit Survey 
 
I. Networks 
1.  How many people in the group in which you are seated do you know?    
2.  How many  people in the  group  have  you spoken with  about  farming  activities  (e.g.,  what  to 
plant, input use, etc.)?    
 
II. Assets 
3. The house in which you live is 
  Owned by you   Owned by your parents/in-laws   Owned by others    Rented 
(if rented,  continue to question  5) 
4. How much do you think  you would have to pay to buy a house similar to yours? 
Amount   Soles 
5. Do you possess one of the following consumer  goods? 
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tor 
    _Car or light truck     _Motorcycle   Heavy truck   Trac- 
 
III. Credit 
6.  If you applied  for a loan at  the  local urban  or rural  Caja or a bank,  do you think they  would 
give it to you? 
7. If you applied  for a loan at a cotton  gin, do you think  they  would give it to you? 
8. If you applied for a loan from an informal moneylender,  do you think  they would give it to you? 
9. In the years 2007-2008, did you obtain a loan in order to pay for your costs of production?    
(If no, continue to question 11) 
10. From  whom did you obtain  this loan? 
    _Bank or Caja   Cotton  gin     _Informal lender 
 
IV. Agricultural Insurance 
11. Do you think  that the instructions we gave you today prior to today’s activities  were: 
    Very dificult __Dificult     Easy     Very easy 
12. Do you remember what happened  if you obtained a loan without insurance  and could not repay 
the loan?    
What happened?   
13. The indemnification that the insurance  paid you depended  on the average yields in the valley? 
 
14.  Did it depend on individual luck?    
15.   If someone  were  to  offer  you insurance  similar  to  what  we saw in  activity  1 for the  next 
agricultural year, would you be interested in buying it?    
16. Would  you be interested in paying  XX Soles per hectare for insurance  similar to what  we saw 
in activity 1 (i.e., farming experiments)? 
(   ) YES  >> Mark with an X the 
maximum he/she would be willing to pay 
(   ) NO >> Mark with an X the 
maximum he/she would be willing to pay 
S/. XX+25  S/. XX•25  
S/. XX+50  S/. XX•50  
S/. XX+75  S/. XX•75  
S/. XX+100  S/. XX•100  
More  less  
 
XX was set at 100, and 150, and 200 Soles. 
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Appendix E. Additional  Regression Results 
 
 
Table  E.1: Ordered  Logit Results  for Project  Choice 
Regressions weighted  by the inverse of the risk estimate variance 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wealth  (10,000 Soles) 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.032 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) 
Financial  Literacy  Indicator  0.127  1.878 
  (0.754)  (1.446) 
Education (years)   0.071  
   (0.026)***  
Number  of Peers in Agric Network -0.151 -0.152 -0.140 -0.159 
(0.094)y (0.095)y (0.092)  (0.096)* 
Est.Probability of Being Risk Rationed1 1.350 1.352 1.359 1.391 
 (0.406)*** (0.406)*** (0.413)*** (0.408)*** 
Prior  Rounds  Earnings–Soles2 -0.103 -0.102 -0.117 -0.070 
 (0.191) (0.191) (0.193) (0.188) 
Two Black Chips,  Insurance  Experiment3 -1.665 -1.668 -1.600 -1.682 
 (0.559)*** (0.562)*** (0.586)*** (0.542)*** 
CRRA  Estimate under  EUT4 1.221 1.255  4.353 
(1.238)  (1.306)  (2.689)y 
CRRA  Estimate Squared -3.389 -3.398  -4.297 
 (1.739)* (1.750)*  (1.855)** 
CRRA  Estimate * Financial    -4.242 
Literacy    (2.975) 
Mean of dependent variable  0.57 
Number  of Observations 350 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.130 0.130 0.129 0.134 
*(**)[***] denotes  significance at 10%(5%)[1%] level. y P-value  less than  0.11. 
Robust  standard errors clustered  by the experimentally-constructed-valleys are reported  in parenthesis. 
All regressions include session fixed effects. 
1  Estimated using a Probit  model with age, education, gender and land size as independent variables. 
2  In low stakes Insurance  Experiment. 3  Indicator variable  for drawing two black chips in the last two 
low stakes rounds.  4 CRRA  estimated assuming  Expected  Utility  Theory-EUT with Fechner  errors. 
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